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THE INTENDED AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF INTENTION 
 
Rachael Wiseman 
 
Abstract. This paper examines the context in which Anscombe wrote Intention—focusing on 
1956-1958. At this time Anscombe was engaged in a number of battles against her university, her 
colleagues and, ultimately, “the spirit of the age”, including her public opposition to Oxford 
University’s decision to award Harry Truman an honorary degree. Intention, I show, must be 
understood as a product of the explicitly ethical and political debates in which Anscombe was 
involved. Understanding the intention with which she wrote Intention suggests that we need 
radically to rethink its nature and character, and that the consequences of the book—
consequences Anscombe foresaw and intended—for work in ethics are yet to be understood.  
  
 
 
 
Introduction 
Intention is a text that has frustrated the most sympathetic of commentators from the moment of 
its publication. Even among those who recognise Anscombe’s book as a classic, there is criticism 
of her style and argument, and confusion about the book’s central theme. Nevertheless, from the 
mid-1960s, there has been a general consensus that Intention contains at least three important 
theses. First, that intentional action and not the mental state of intending to act is the more basic notion 
of intention. Second, that an agent’s knowledge of the states and motions of her body is “non-
observational”, in something like the way that her knowledge of the states of her mind is. Third, 
that actions are individuated—at least primarily—in terms of bodily action; so that if I put my 
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signature on a piece of paper that is an order for a bomb to be dropped and which brings about 
the end of the war and blunts my pen nib and gives me cramp, I still only do one thing.1 
 There has been further consensus that Intention does not provide adequate argument to 
establish these theses, nor the sort of theoretical and technical detail needed to sustain them. 
This verdict has acted as an invitation to others to amend, clarify, develop, and correct 
Anscombe’s offering. The legacy of Intention has been a continuing debate around these theses, 
mostly conducted in academic journals, with friends and allies seeking to provide the technical 
scaffolding Anscombe omits, and foes attempting to show that the scaffolding fails. 
 In this paper I argue that this widespread view of Intention is fundamentally mistaken. 
Anscombe does not intend to offer a novel account of action, but something which “isn’t a 
philosophical thesis at all”.2 This becomes clear once we view Intention as the product of the 
ethical debates in which Anscombe was engaged between 1956 - 1958. Through those debates 
Anscombe came to realise that moral philosophy had lost sight of the distinctive use of the 
question ‘What is she doing?’, the use which marks out the class of intentional actions (Intention, 
sss23, 37). This question, as she saw it, was essential to identifying the nature and quality of an 
act, a category without which moral philosophy could not precede. Once we reframe Intention as 
a corrective to this oversight, it becomes clear that the idea that we need to complete 
Anscombe’s account by providing technical detail or argumentative support is based on a deep 
misunderstanding of the sort of philosophical undertaking that Intention is, and of the status of 
the statements it contains. 
1. The unintended consequences of Intention 
                                                     
1 Though, see Ford, Hornsby, Stoutland (eds), Essays on Anscombe’s Intention (London: Harvard University Press, 2011) for a 
number of essays which attempt to disrupt this interpretative consensus. See especially Frederick Stoutland, “Introduction: 
Anscombe’s Intention in Context” and Richard Moran and Martin J. Stone, “Anscombe on Expressions of Intention: An 
Exegesis”. 
2 Anscombe, “Under a Description” in her Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Basil Blackwell) 1981, 208-211. 
Originally published in Nous, 13 (1979). This how Anscombe describes her statement, in Intention, that “one and the same action 
may have many descriptions” (210); my contention in this paper is that the same can be said of the statements in Intention more 
generally:  
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Intention was reviewed in at least seven major English-language philosophical journals: The Journal 
of Philosophy, The Philosophical Review, Philosophy of Science, Mind, Philosophy, The Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, and Philosophical Quarterly. The Catholic British weekly, The Tablet, also carried a 
review.4 Feelings were mixed. Every reader found Anscombe’s monograph hard-going. P. T. 
Heath, the most critical reviewer, accused Anscombe of “indifference to the ordinary standards 
of literary exposition”, and concluded that “the work seems hardly to have got beyond the stage 
of a first draft”.5 Kurt Baier, whose review is much more sympathetic and insightful than 
Heath’s, reported nevertheless that “the book as a whole is baffling and the outline of its over-all 
theme not easily discerned”, and admitted he would “probably not have persevered in looking 
for it if I had not undertaken to write this review”.6 A. Phillips Griffiths suggests, rather 
diplomatically, that “the reader’s task would have been lightened if more explicit direction had 
been given within the text as to the turns the argument is taking”.7  
The difficulty of Intention, perhaps accounts for the fact that—at least in some circles—
Anscombe’s book came to be seen as something like the “first draft” that Heath suspected it of 
being.8 From the 1960s there has been a steady stream of work which aims to move from 
Anscombe’s “first draft” to a complete account of the nature of human action. Much of this 
work has been focussed around three particularly striking features of Anscombe’s treatment of 
her topic. These features are undoubtedly present, but I will argue that they their significance has 
been misinterpreted. 
First, Anscombe is more concerned with intentional action than with the mental state of 
intending to act. She denies that “if we wish to understand what intention is, we must be 
                                                     
4 4 Judith Jarvis, “Review”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Jan 1, 1959); Roderick M. Chisholm, “Review”, The Philosophical 
Review, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Jan 1959); Irving M. Copi, “Review”, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Apr. 1959); K. W. Rankin, 
“Review”, Mind, Vol 68, No. 270 (Apr. 1959), 261-264; A. Phillips Griffiths, “Review”, Philosophy, Vol. 34. No. 130 (Jul. 1959), 
245-247; P. L. Heath, “Review”, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 40 (Jul. 1960); Kurt Baier (1960) “Critical notice”, 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 38:1, 71-81; Illtyd Trethovvan, “The Ethics of Intention” The Tablet, 11th January 1958. 
5 Heath, op. cit., 282. 
6 Baier, op. cit., 71. 
7 Griffiths, op. cit., 247. 
8 Though, no-one says this of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations.  
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investigating something whose existence is purely in the sphere of the mind”, and says that on 
the contrary the “first thing” we should consider in an enquiry into intention is “what physically 
takes place, i.e. what a man actually does” (§4, p. 9).  This preference for considering intentional 
action over what goes on “in the sphere of the mind” is reflected in the structure of Intention: 46 
out of its 52 paragraphs focus on the question, “What distinguishes actions which are intentional 
from those which are not?”9 
This much is beyond dispute; however, the explanation of the priority that is commonly 
offered is not. The explanation goes as follows: rather than holding—as is natural—that 
“intention” first and foremost refers to states of mind, and that bodily movements are described 
as “intentional” when they bear a certain relation—causal or explanatory—to such a state, 
Anscombe holds that “intentional” applies first and foremost to a class of bodily movements.10 
Donald Davidson, in his early work, attempted to develop this idea. He argued that when we 
give the intention with which a person acts—for example, when we say “James went to church 
with the intention of pleasing his mother”—we do not thereby refer to a state of mind that 
accompanies his action; rather the function of expressions like “the intention with which James 
went to church” is to “generate new descriptions of actions in terms of their reasons”.11 
Davidson came to think that his attempt to dispose with the referential use of 
“intention”—and hence the mental state as referent—ended in failure.  The difficulty Davidson 
found was to account for “pure intending”, which he defined as “intending that may occur 
without practical reasoning, action, or consequence”.12 In short, it is a problem for the view that 
the mental state of intending can be explained away, or explained by the more basic category of 
intentional action, if the mental state can occur in perfect isolation. Davidson concluded that the 
                                                     
9 I count here paragraphs whose focus is intentional action and intention with which an action is done. As becomes clear, in giving the 
intention with which an action is done, one also gives a description of the intentional action. §1-3 and 50-52 are the excluded 
paragraphs. 
10 See, e.g. Michael Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 1, 3. For 
discussion of this passage, see Moran and Stone, op. cit., 38-9.  
11 Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes” in his Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 8.  
12 Davidson, “Intending”, op. cit., 83. 
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intelligibility of pure intending compels a theorist to admit the referential use of “intention” into 
her theory.13 And once it has been admitted that “I intend to X” sometimes involves reference to 
the mental state of intending, “there is no reason not to allow that intention of exactly the same 
kind is also present when the intended action eventuates”.14 The problem he located would cause 
problems for Anscombe too—at least on this understanding of the kind of priority she gives to 
intentional action..15 
Second, Anscombe says that an agent knows her intentional actions “without 
observation”.16 This statement has intrigued philosophers of mind. It seems to suggest that one 
might have immediate, or perhaps groundless, knowledge of the states of one’s body, in the way 
that epistemologists have traditionally thought is possible for states of one’s mind.17 The 
difficulty is that Intention contains no adequate account of the nature of “non-observational 
knowledge”, nor any explanation of how it might be possible to have knowledge of one’s 
movements and actions which is not perceptually grounded. When Anscombe introduces the 
phrase she does so negatively, via a criterion for speaking of knowing by observing:  
where we can speak of separately describable sensations, having which is in some sense 
our criterion for saying something, then we can speak of observing that thing; but that is 
not generally so when we know the position of our limbs.18 
Anscombe has generally been taken to be suggesting that when we have knowledge without 
observation, it is via sensations that are not separately describable, but this is itself a very unclear 
notion, not elucidated in Intention. G. N. A. Vesey complained that the “attempt to understand 
                                                     
13 The case that Davidson describes is extremely odd, and it is not clear to me that it is coherent. Yet, as Anscombe points out, 
“No reason” is sometimes an intelligible answer to the question “Why?” (Intention, §17-18; §51). It is clear, however that 
Anscombe deals with such cases without taking them to show—as does Davidson—that “there is something there to be 
abstracted” (ibid, 89).  
14 Davidson, ibid., 89. 
15 For discussion, see Moran and Stone, op. cit.. 
16 Anscombe, Intention, 14. 
17 G. N. A. Vesey, “Knowledge Without Observation”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 72, 201. For other examples, see C. B. Martin, 
“Knowledge without Observation”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 1, no. 1 (Sept. 1971), 15-24; McDowell, John (2011). 
“Anscombe on Bodily Self-Knowledge”, in Ford, Hornsby, and Stoutland (eds), op. cit., 128-46; Andy Hamilton, The Self in 
Question, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), ch. 4. 
18 Anscombe, Intention, 13. 
6 
 
what Miss Anscombe means by ‘knowledge without observation’ is like a treasure hunt”—the 
“treasure” being an understanding of “the way in which the mind is embodied”—which, 
unfortunately ‘seem[s] to lead, not to philosophical treasure at all, but to … absurdity”.19  
Third, Anscombe seems to suggest that actions are individuated in terms of bodily 
action; so that if I put my signature on a piece of paper which is an order for a bomb to be 
dropped and which brings about the end of the war and blunts my pen nib and gives me cramp, 
I still only do one thing.20 Following Goldman’s A Theory of Human Action, this view became 
known as the “Identity thesis” or the “Davidson-Anscombe thesis”, formalised as: if a person Fs 
by G-ing, then her act of F-ing=her act of G-ing.21 Davidson commented that this thesis 
“immediately raises a number of questions, the first of which is, what are the entities that are 
identical or different?”.22Anscombe has nothing to say on that ontological question.23 
In the decade following the publication of Intention, over 400 articles on its topic were 
published in peer-reviewed philosophy journals. Reviewing Goldman’s book in 1972, Myles 
Brand lamented the fact that although (or perhaps, because) almost all of the “profitable 
discussion” had taken place in journals, the result was “piecemeal, often disunified”. It was rare, 
he said to see views on “act individuation, basic action, reasons as causes … integrated into a 
coherent whole”.24 The idea that Anscombe’s book contains these three sketched, but 
inadequately articulated, theses, has meant it has been rarer still to see attempts to understand 
Intention as a coherent whole.  
 
I want to take us back to those early reviews, and focus on a puzzle that came up for two 
reviewers—Judith Jarvis and Illtyd Trethovvan—but which has never really been part of the 
                                                     
19 Vesey, op. cit., 201. 
20 In fact, this is not Anscombe’s view, as we will see below.  
21 Goldman, A Theory of Human Action (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970). This formalisation is from George Wilson 
and Samuel Shpall, “Action”, in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2012). Anscombe responds to Goldman in “Under a 
Description”, op. cit., 211-14. 
22 Davidson, “Aristotle’s Action”, reprinted in his Truth, Language and History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 284. 
23 Anscombe says that she has “always balked at this question (“Under a Description”, 210). 
24 Myles Brand, “Review”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 69, No. 9 (May 4, 1972), 249. The ‘400’ figure is Brand’s. 
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exegetical literature. In doing so I raise a question that is strikingly absent in work on Anscombe, 
especially when one considers its prominence in work on her teacher, Wittgenstein: what is the 
philosophical method of Intention?  
Neither Jarvis nor Trethovvan characterise Intention as a sketch of a theory of action, but 
instead see it as a contribution toward a descriptive project, designed to clear away 
misunderstandings and accreted errors about the grammar of the concept of “intention”. This is 
the sort of project that might be associated with Wittgenstein or with the Oxford ordinary 
language philosophers—Anscombe’s colleagues.25 Jarvis proposes that Anscombe’s major 
achievement is to “cut through a whole mass of philosophical clichés” and “give us a fresh, 
detailed picture of the concept of an action”.26 Trethovvan says that Intention “exposes the 
inadequacy or the inaccuracy of a good many statements which we might ordinarily let pass on 
the subject of intention”.27 
These reviewers read Intention as looking to provide an accurate description of how we 
apply the concept of intention, rather than a first sketch of a theory of action. If we look at 
Intention’s opening paragraph, we can bring this contrast into sharper focus.  
Very often, when a man says “I am going to do such-and-such, we should say that this 
was an expression of intention. We also sometimes speak of an action as intentional, and 
we may also ask with what intention the thing was done. In each case we employ a 
concept of “intention”; now if we set out to describe this concept, and took only one of 
these three kinds of statement as containing our whole topic, we might very likely say 
                                                     
25  
The question of the relation between Wittgenstein’s grammatical method, and the methods of Oxford ordinary language 
philosophy—and indeed, the further question of Anscombe’s understanding of that relation—is by no means straightforward. In 
his review, Copi stresses the similarity, saying that “[Anscombe’s] method is the familiar one, now prevalent at Oxford, of 
considering what one would say, or would accept as significant to say, in this or that particular situation. That method, however, 
is employed more sensitively and more sensibly by Miss Anscombe than by most of its other practitioners today” (op. cit., 148). 
However, Mary Warnock recalls that Anscombe was “absolutely furious” at her suggestion that she “thought Wittgenstein would 
agree with much of what had gone on in [Austin’s] things class” (Mary Warnock, A Memoir: People and Places, 65).  
For helpful suggestions on the relation of Wittgenstein and ordinary language philosophy , see Andy Hamilton, Routledge 
Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (London: Routledge, 2014), 243-5.  
26 Jarvis, op. cit., 41. Amazing that there are absolutely no clichés or metaphors in Anscombe’s Intention, nor indeed, as far as I can 
tell, in any of her writings. 
27 Trethevvan, op. cit., 12. 
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things about what “intention” means which it would be false to say in one of the other 
cases.28  
When Anscombe’s book is read as offering a novel theory of action, §1 is understood to make a 
tripartite division which introduces “philosophical perplexity” and an explanatory task for 
philosophy.29 The task is to explain the nature of the connections between the following: the 
mental state of intending to act, intentional action, and reason for acting (intention with which).30 In 
contrast, when read as an application of the methods of ordinary language philosophy, the 
section does not introduce a puzzle but, as we might put it, the range of statements that are the 
book’s topic. Three sorts of statement employ the concept of intention:  
 When she said “I am going to fail this exam”, she was expressing her intention. 
 She jumped intentionally. 
 She left with the intention of fetching him. 
The task is accurately to describe the conditions under which such statements are true or 
significant.31 We can begin to see the difficulty of that task by considering the three, superficially 
similar, statements which do not employ the concept:  
 When she said “I am going to fail this exam”, she was making a prediction. 
 She jumped involuntarily. 
 The thought “I must fetch him!” caused her to leave?32 
In each case, as Anscombe puts it, “the distinction … is intuitively clear”—in the sense that we 
have no problems with it in our everyday human interactions—but “if … we ask in philosophy 
                                                     
28 Anscombe, Intention, 1. 
29 This is Kieran Setiya’s phrase in “Intention”, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 2014. 
30 Indeed, Setiya describes this as the “principal task of the philosophy of intention”, ibid. Moran and Stone, in their “Anscombe 
on Expressions of Intention”, call this view “transformed Anscombe”, and make an excellent case against reading Anscombe as 
introducing and undertaking a “connective” explanatory project; for one thing, they point out, Anscombe’s first head is 
“expression of intention for the future” and not the mental state of intending to act (esp. 34-5).  
31 Anscombe, in fact, offers a diagnosis in §1 of why we feel the need to undertake the connective project: “where we are 
tempted to speak of “different senses” of a word which is clearly not equivocal, we may infer that we are in fact pretty much in 
the dark about this character of the concept which it represents”, 1. 
32 As Anscombe stresses in Intention, (§5 and §10-15 ) and in “Intention” (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 57 
(1956-1957), 321-332), the difference between giving the cause of her leaving and giving a reason is far from straightforward, as 
these cases show. Consider, ‘She suddenly thought “I must fetch him!” and was so upset by this impulsive idea she left the room 
in order to get some fresh air”.    
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what the difference is … we are really asking what each of these is”, and that is not ‘something 
that is intuitively obvious”.33  
 
At the end of this essay, I will say something about the way in which this shift in how we think 
about the task and method of Intention changes the way we understand the priority Anscombe 
gives to intentional action, her statement that we know our actions “without observation”, and 
the passages on action individuation. But first, I want to address a question that immediately 
arises when Intention is viewed as undertaking a descriptive, rather than an explanatory, project. 
The question is: what Intention is for? What is the point of a description of the use of these three 
kinds of statement? It will not give us a theory of action—at least, not in any traditional sense—
and it will not move us beyond the knowledge that is already manifested in our capacity to 
employ the concept of “intention”. As Anscombe acknowledges, these distinctions are already 
intuitively obvious. Jarvis attempts to reassure those “readers who will say: now that we’ve been 
through all of this, what have we?”, by explaining that Anscombe has exposed “the sources of a 
host of philosophical muddles in which one can find oneself in dealing with these concepts”.34 
This is the standard defence of descriptive methods in philosophy, but it leaves many 
unimpressed—especially when what one has to go through is so difficult. Trethovvan articulates 
his worry more forthrightly:  
Those who are not familiar with this kind of analysis will find it extremely heavy going. 
Anybody, I suppose, would find it difficult. Miss Anscombe holds that philosophy ought 
to be difficult, and this is obviously true if it means that philosophy ought not to be 
banal. The question which arises here is whether, in view of this extreme complexity, the 
results she has achieved ought to be called banal. This is not to suggest that the book is 
not worth reading. It provides a mental exercise of a kind which is most valuable in 
                                                     
33 Intention, 1-2 and 6.  
34 Jarvis, op. cit., p. 41. 
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virtue of its very strenuousness; it exposes the inadequacy or the inaccuracy of a good 
many statements which we might ordinarily let pass on the subject of intention; and it 
has an undercurrent, with occasional ebullitions, of quite remarkably caustic wit. But an 
analysis of intention which eschews all ethical questions seems doomed to reach rather 
unimportant conclusions.35 
In the remainder of this paper I want to answer Trethovvan’s question: ought Intention to be 
called banal? My suggestion is that Anscombe intended her ethics-free book to make it possible 
to do ethics; as such, the conclusions are far from unimportant. Though Anscombe eschews 
ethical questions, she intends the book to have profound consequences for ethics. The content is 
banal in its etymological sense—“common to all”—but certainly not in its usual English sense of 
“obvious” or “clichéd”.  
 
2. Anscombe on the public stage 
Intention was published in 1957. Between 1956 and 1958 Anscombe was engaged in a series of 
public arguments with her colleagues, her university, and her compatriots. During these three 
years, Anscombe came to recognise that the Hebrew-Christian ethic, the moral worldview of her 
Catholic religion, was utterly at odds with both the “highest and best ideals of the country at 
large” and with the moral philosophy of her contemporaries.36 She saw the rejection of the older 
ethic as deeply corrupting, and as responsible for creating “an actually murderous world”.37 Her 
Christian ethical outlook, she found, was “hateful to the spirit of the age”,38 not because of its 
normative content, but because it held that there are some kinds of action for which “it is correct 
to say “One doesn’t have to consider whether to do this or not, in any circumstances; it is simply 
                                                     
35 Trethovvan, op. cit., 12. 
36 Anscombe, “Does Oxford Moral Philosophy Corrupt the Youth?”, The Listener (London, BBC), February 14, 1957, Issue 1455, 
157.. 
37 Anscombe, “The Dignity of a Human Being”, in Mary Geach and Mark Gormally (eds), Human Life, Action and Ethics: Essays by 
Anscombe (Exeter: Imprint Academia, 2005), 73. 
38 Anscombe, “Contraception and Chastity”, in Mary Geach and Luke Gormally (eds), Faith in a Hard Ground: Essays on Religion, 
Philosophy and Ethics by G. E. M. Anscombe (Exeter: Imprint Academia, 2008) 191. 
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excluded”.39 Anscombe was drawn into bitter public rows because she felt moved to defend that 
“hateful” truth. Her defence, however, is not of interest only to Christians. Anscombe, we will 
see, looks to provide a conceptual framework within which a secular, as well as theistic, ethics of 
prohibition could be articulated.  
It is against this deeply ethical—and for Anscombe, religious—context that we must see 
Intention. In short, an ethics according to which some actions are excluded simply in virtue of 
their kind, requires a criterion for the nature and quality of an act. Anscombe, through these rows, 
came to recognise that such a criterion was lacking. Her intention in Intention is to rectify this 
lack. 
 In this section we look at that historical context, and at those public debates in which 
Anscombe participated between 1956 and 1958. In them we witness Anscombe’s gradually 
coming to the view that “it is not profitable for us to do moral philosophy until we have an 
adequate philosophy of psychology”.40 In the next section I will return to the intended 
consequences of Intention. 
 
On 1st May 1956, Oxford University’s Convocation—the University’s governing body, 
comprised of all its academics—considered nominations for honorary degrees, to be awarded the 
following month. One of the nominations was Harry S. Truman, former President of the United 
States, and the man who had given the order to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
Anscombe, then a tutor at Somerville College, “caused a small stir” in the House by arguing that 
                                                     
39 Anscombe, The Listener, February 28, 1957, Issue 1457, 349. In this paper I want to exclude questions about content—about 
which kinds of acts fall within the prohibition. Here we are concerned with the work that must be done before any ethics of 
prohibition is to be possible. Anscombe coined the label “consequentialism” to describe any philosophical view which denied 
that it was ever correct to say “One doesn’t have to consider whether to do this or not, in any circumstances; it is simply 
excluded” (“Modern Moral Philosophy”, in Ethics, Religion and Politics: The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), 36. It is worth noting how far the meaning of the label has shifted since Anscombe introduced it 
(For a helpful discussion, see Mary Geach’s introduction to Human Life, Action, and Ethics, xvii-iii; and Cora Diamond, 
“Consequentialism in Modern Moral Philosophy and in ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’”. In Oderberg, David S. and Jacqueline A. 
Laing, Human lives: critical essays on consequentialist bioethics, (Palgrave Macmillan, 1977), 13-38). 
40 Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, 26. 
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the nomination should be rejected on the grounds that Truman was guilty of mass murder.41 As 
such, she said, to show him honours was sycophantic and no different in principle from showing 
them to Nero or Genghis Khan.  
Anscombe’s speech did not persuade—though there is reason to suspect that this was 
less a matter of her argument than of the fact that members had already made up their minds 
and were not prepared to change them.42 The House was asked to indicate its attitude toward the 
nomination, and showed overwhelming support.43 On 20th June, Truman was awarded his 
honorary degree. Asked by a journalist about Anscombe’s intervention, Truman stated: “I made 
the decision [to use the bombs] on the facts as they existed at the time, and if I had to do it again 
I would do it all over again”.44 
 The fact that Truman was forced to rebut Anscombe’s argument gives an indication of 
the very public nature of her protest. Reporters from the Manchester Guardian and The Times were 
present at Convocation, and both papers carried pieces on her protest, including summaries of 
her argument. Across the Atlantic, the New York Times picked up the story. Anscombe herself 
contributed to the public dissemination of her view by publishing her speech as a pamphlet. This 
publication was reported in the Manchester Guardian, which told its readers that it “shows that she 
had a respectable case”. Insightfully, the paper also notes that Anscombe’s argument “took in far 
more than Mr Truman” but extended to “all the princes and potentates of the earth—among 
them the democratic electorates”.45 
 
                                                     
41 “Limiting War”, The Manchester Guardian, Jun 4, 1956, 6 
42 Anscombe, in her pamphlet, recalls that the “dons of St John’s were simply told “The women are up to something in 
Convocation; we have to go and vote them down” (“Mr Truman’s Degree”, in Ethics, Religion and Politics: The Collected Philosophical 
Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe, 65) 
43 Just who did and didn’t side with Anscombe is a matter of some dispute. At the time, both The Times and the Manchester 
Guardian reported that “there were no calls of “Non placet” when the proposal was put before the House”. However, R. D. M. 
Foot, who was also present, wrote to the Manchester Guardian to inform them that Anscombe’s “Non placet” had been echoed by 
some in the House (“Degree for Mr Truman”, Manchester Guardian, May 7, 1956, 6). He does not give names.  
44 “Oxford Don Fights Honor for Truman”, New York Times, Jun 19, 1956, 3.  
45 “Limiting War”, op. cit. 
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The facts that provide the background to Anscombe’s intervention are familiar. In July 1945, the 
Allied forces were engaged in war with Japan, and were seeking the Japanese forces’ 
unconditional surrender. One military option for achieving this end was a land invasion, but 
there was good evidence that this would have catastrophic consequences. A month earlier, at the 
battle of Okinawa—the result of Allied forces invading the Japanese island—90,000 soldiers 
(U.S. and Japanese) and 150,000 civilians were killed. Mass suicides were reported among the 
Japanese people. On the expectation that such losses would be repeated if troops were put on 
the ground, Truman ruled out a land invasion to “prevent […] an Okinawa from one end of 
Japan to the other”.46 These are among the “facts as they existed at the time”.  
 Alternative means of securing unconditional surrender were sought, and the decision was 
taken to issue an ultimatum to the Japanese government: if it did not surrender unconditionally, 
the country would face “prompt and utter destruction”. The Potsdam Declaration set out this 
ultimatum, and was signed by Truman, along with the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, 
and Chiang Kai-sheck, Leader of the Nationalist Government of China. The Japanese did not 
surrender and the threat was carried out: on 6th August Truman ordered an atomic bomb to be 
dropped on Nagasaki. Still no surrender came. On 9th August Truman ordered an atomic bomb 
to be dropped on Hiroshima. These two bombs killed between 75,000 and 125,000 people on 
impact, with the same number again dying before the end of the year of injuries and the effects 
of radiation. On 2nd September 1945 the Allies’ end was achieved and the Japanese government 
surrendered unconditionally.  
 Anscombe says that Truman was guilty of mass murder. She does not object to killing or 
to war—Anscombe is no pacifist—but to murder.47 Murder, Anscombe says, is “one of the 
worst of human actions” and as such is subject to absolute prohibition.48 It follows that the 
                                                     
46 David M. Kennedy, The American People in World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 410. 
47 Anscombe calls pacifism a false and harmful doctrine (“Mr Truman’s Degree”, 69). See also “War and Murder”, in Ethics, 
Religion, and Politics, 51-61; see esp., 55-7.. 
48 “Mr Truman’s Degree”, 64. 
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predicted or actual consequences of a murderous act are irrelevant to the question of whether or 
not it should be done; it should not. Thus, when Truman says that he made his decision “on the 
facts as they existed at the time”, he reveals himself to be denying that “it is correct to say [of 
dropping bombs on civilian populations] “One doesn’t have to consider whether to do this or 
not, in any circumstances; it is simply excluded”’. 
 In her speech to Convocation, Anscombe sets out to show that when Truman ordered 
the dropping of the bombs, what he did was murder. Killing is murder if it meets two further 
conditions: it is intentional and the victims are innocent.49 Her focus is on the second of these 
conditions and for this reason she devotes much of her speech to distinguishing her view from 
pacifist opposition to all intentional killing—which would include killing enemy combatants in 
war—and to considering the application of “innocent” in the context of war. However, our 
interest is in the first condition: that the killing be intentional. Anscombe, in 1956, supposed that 
it could not be seriously denied that Truman intentionally ordered the killing of the people of 
Nagasaki and Hiroshima. After all, he signed the order, and their deaths—their “prompt and 
utter destruction”—were the means by which Japan’s unconditional surrender was to be 
achieved. In her pamphlet she mentions the speech given by the censor of St. Catherine’s 
college, who spoke in defence of the nomination, and who seems rather inchoately to gesture 
toward such a denial:  
Mr Truman did not make the bombs and decide to drop them without consulting 
anybody; no, he was only responsible for the decision. Hang it all, you can’t make a man 
responsible just because “his signature is at the foot of the order”.50 
Anscombe simply remarks that ‘such a speech does not deserve scrutiny; after all, it was just 
something to say on such an occasion”.51 She does not take seriously the Censor’s suggestion 
                                                     
49 Ibid, 64. 
50 Ibid, 66. 
51 Ibid, 66. 
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that Truman can be held responsible only for signing his name, and not for all that followed. As 
we will see, Anscombe soon discovered that this was a misjudgement on her part. 
 
The following year, on February 14th, Anscombe gave a talk on BBC radio’s Third Programme. Her 
topic was “Does Oxford Moral Philosophy Corrupt the Youth?” Anscombe argued that it did 
not, but only because the youth were already exposed to the corrupting ideas of that philosophy 
in their life before university.  
 Anscombe’s thesis is that the accusation is unfair because “Oxford moral philosophy is 
perfectly in tune with the highest and best ideas of the country at large”.52 She cites as evidence 
six ideas which make up the views of the country at large, and which are reflected in or 
supported by the moral philosophy of her colleagues. 
(1) An anti-Platonic view of justice, according to which a just society is one which is well-
arranged, rather than one in which individuals act justly. 
(2) A “high” conception of responsibility for the future, limited only by our capacity to 
calculate the consequences of our action or inaction. So, a person is responsible for all 
the foreseen consequences of what she does. 
(3) A “gentle” conception of responsibility for the past, in which it is unfair to hold 
someone wholly responsible for what she did, given that it had all sorts of causes. So, 
causal factors which contributed to her doing what she did, or which were necessary to it 
having the results that it had, must be taken into account when assessing the extent of 
her responsibility. 
(4) A horror of suffering. 
(5) A flexibility about principles, which allows that one may choose the principles by which 
one wishes to live, and may change those principles in accord with circumstance.  
                                                     
52 “Does Oxford Moral Philosophy Corrupt the Youth?”, 267. 
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(6) A feeling that the changing nature of the world makes it wrong to impose a rigid moral 
code on children, who must be allowed to develop their own principles.53 
In her radio-talk, Anscombe confines herself to “demonstrat[ing her thesis] in a few 
instances”—that is, to giving examples which show that these ideas are common to her 
colleague’s moral philosophy and the country at large.54 She conveys her contempt for them 
through a mixture of mockery and sarcasm—the tone is not so far from Swift’s A Modest 
Proposal.55 For example, she notes that it follows from (1) and (2) that “the correct procedure in 
making moral [and legal] decisions” is to “calculate the improvement of the general state of 
affairs”, and also “that this is the correct procedure … is constantly taught in the university”. She 
illustrates its working in the world at large with the following example: 
A frequent occurrence that is much in the same spirit is the removal by authority of 
elderly widows from their dwelling, which anyone can see they are not keeping in 
accordance with the standards of hygiene which are desirable for their own and general 
welfare.56 
Though forcibly removing widows from their homes on grounds of public hygiene is some way 
short of eating plump infants to alleviate the suffering of the poor, in presenting the practice 
Anscombe is clearly aiming for a similar effect on the reader as was Swift. 
Among the actions that (1)-(6) make permissible, is murder; that is, those ideas have 
nothing in them which would allow us to say, “One doesn’t have to consider whether to commit 
murder, in any circumstances; it is simply excluded”. We can see this if we consider once again 
the case of Truman. Truman does not act justly, in the Platonic sense, when he orders the killing 
                                                     
53 These can be located in her talk. Anscombe also lists them, in this way, in “Oxford Moral Philosophy”, The Listener, April 04, 
1957, 537.  
54 “Does Oxford Moral Philosophy Corrupt the Youth?”, 267. See also her letter to The Listener on 4th April, in which she cites 
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55 Reflecting on her paper “War and Murder”, published in 1961, Anscombe expresses regret that it was “written in a tone of 
righteous fury”—Jenny Teichman describes Anscombe’s tone in that paper as “like the Prophet Jeremiah’s” (J. Teichman, 
“Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe: 1919-2001”, Biographical memoirs of fellows, Vol. 115, Oxford University Press, 2002), 49. 
Anscombe laments that “if I was torn by a saeva indignatio, I wish I had the talent of Swift in expressing it” (Introduction to Ethics, 
Religion and Politics, p. vii. (The latin phrase is from Swift’s self-penned epitaph)).  
56 “Does Oxford Moral Philosophy Corrupt the Youth?”, 267. 
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of Japanese civilians; however, if justice is a matter of the arrangement of society, we may think 
that insofar as the unconditional surrender that Truman’s act brings about is one which is better 
arranged—peaceful and democratic, for example—we may evaluate his action as promoting 
justice [1]. It might be said that Truman would have been neglecting his responsibilities if he had 
refrained from murdering Japanese civilians, given that he was able to predict the relative 
consequences of dropping the bomb and not dropping it, and to calculate that the former state 
of affairs was better [2].57 However, as the Censor indicated, we cannot hold him wholly 
responsible for those murders, given that his order was just one of the many causal antecedents; 
his order alone did not bring about those deaths—he was just one tiny cog in a complex causal 
machine [3].58 One of the reasons why we may think of his action as necessary—though 
obviously regrettable—is that he prevented even worse suffering than the suffering he caused; 
anything which decreases suffering is to be admired [4]. Thus, though it is clearly a good rule of 
thumb that murder is morally wrong, given certain circumstances, other principles, like the 
principle that one has a moral duty to do what is best for one’s country, may replace them [5]. 
Finally, given that young people are growing into an increasingly complex world, in which the 
consequences of actions are ever more wide-reaching and interconnected, children should be 
taught to be flexible in their moral outlook, and to recognise that moral laws are like the 
Queensbury rules [6].  
 
Anscombe makes absolutely no attempt to disguise her disgust at the ethical outlook embodied 
in (1)-(6), nor her contempt toward those who propagate it. Her talk outraged her colleagues and 
peers. Over the seven weeks following her broadcast, the BBC’s The Listener magazine published 
fifteen letters to the editor, before announcing the correspondence closed. Four were from 
                                                     
57 In fact, Anscombe quite fiercely denies the claim that Truman saved lives with his act. See fn. 73. 
58 Compare the Censor’s defence, and the argument made in defence of Mr Truman by the dons in “Worcester, in All Souls, in 
New College”: “It would be wrong to try to PUNISH Mr Truman” (“Mr Truman’s Degree”, 65). 
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Anscombe, defending her thesis and her reputation; the rest were from her Oxford colleagues 
and other philosophers.  
R. M. Hare, one of the Oxford moral philosophers whom Anscombe is attacking, took 
particular exception. This is no surprise as he is explicitly identified in Anscombe’s talk. She 
begins by referring to a review in Mind which reported that “there are people who think that 
moral philosophy in one of its current fashions “corrupts the youth”“.59 She refers here to R. B. 
Braithwaite’s review of Hare’s The Langauge of Morals. In that review, Braithwaite says that the 
charge of corruption would be “utterly fantastic in the case of Mr. Hare” due to his “high moral 
earnestness”.60 Anscombe remarks that earnestness is “not good evidence” for the claim some 
someone is not a corrupter; on the contrary, she says, “if you really wanted to corrupt people … 
moral earnestness would, in fact, be an important item of equipment”.61  
Hare took Anscombe’s opening remarks to imply—which of course they don’t—that “if 
someone seems to be earnest about a moral question, the obvious explanation is that this is  ‘an 
important piece of equipment’ for corrupting people”.62 Her point is negative: moral earnestness 
is not evidence that someone is not corrupt.63 He also represents her as disapproving of “the 
desire to prevent suffering, especially that of children”. What Anscombe says is that what it 
means to take “preventive measures” in relation to children’s welfare (in order to prevent 
suffering [4]) is to determine to “go into people’s homes to push them around, not because they 
have done anything, but just in case they do”; her point is that suffering ought not to be 
prevented by unjust action, not that the desire to prevent children from suffering is invalid.64 
                                                     
59 “Does Oxford Moral Philosophy Corrupt the Youth?”, 266 
60 R. B. Braithwaite, “Review”, Mind, Vol. 63, No. 250 (Apr., 1954), 249. 
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62 R. M. Hare, “Oxford Moral Philosophy”, The Listener, February 21, 1957, 311. 
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64 Anscombe, “Does Oxford Moral Philosophy Corrupt the Youth?”, 267. 
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Anscombe dismisses his accusations as “simple expressions of rage”.65 He attributes to her the 
view—which he finds incredible—that is it “wrong to judge acts by the foreseen consequences 
of committing them”.66 But, Anscombe thinks only that it is wrong to think that every kind of 
act is such that it may be rendered permissible by its consequences.  
Antony Flew describes her broadcast as full of “bitter sneers” and “an affront to 
professional standards and to the decencies of controversy”. He accuses her of 
“characteristically” relying on “the fact that few of her readers will ... check any assertion she may 
find it convenient to make”.67 Nowell-Smith says she uses “sarcasm, innuendo, and travesty” to 
spread “misrepresentation about colleagues”.68Anscombe replies that her colleagues “aren’t angry 
at me because I misrepresented them, but because I represented them truthfully. Really, their 
only objection should be that I laughed at them”.69 
 The letters display a startling misapprehension of Anscombe’s talk. Her style is difficult, 
it is true, but the lack of understanding looks at times wilful. Her claim is that there is a 
worldview—prevalent in society and reflected in the work of her colleagues—according to which 
justice is a matter of how things are arranged, and actions are evaluated by their foreseen 
consequences. That worldview, she says, may make permissible or preferable courses of action—
for example, certain procedures for looking after widows—which are unjust, in the Platonic 
sense.  
 
Anscombe’s strategy of holding up for derision the implications of (1)-(6) was not particularly 
successful, and not just because it elicited rage rather than critical engagement. She perhaps 
underestimated the extent to which the actions that she saw as shocking—authorities intervening 
to prevent cruelty to children by “go[ing] into people’s homes to push them around”; bombing 
                                                     
65 Ancombe, “Oxford Moral Philosophy”, The Listener, February 28, 1957, 349. 
66 R. M. Hare, “Oxford Moral Philosophy”, The Listener, February 21, 1957, 311. 
67 Anthony Flew, “Oxford Moral Philosophy”, The Listener, February 28, 1957, 349; and March 21, 457. 
68 Nowell-Smith, “Oxford Moral Philosophy”, The Listener, March 14, 1957, 405. 
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civilian populations; removing widows from there homes—would strike her peers as quite 
sensible policies. A lot of what Anscombe finds shocking fails to shock. What helps to bring out 
the radical character of (1)-(6)—the familiarity of which can make them seem benign—is to 
contrast with their negations. This will give us the framework for the ethic Anscombe seeks to 
recover.   
(1') A Platonic view of justice, according to which a just society is one in which individuals 
act justly, rather than one which is well-arranged. 
(2') A “practicable” conception of responsibility for the future, limited to what we intend or 
voluntarily bring about. 
(3') A ‘severe” conception of responsibility for the past, in which a person is wholly 
responsible for what he does, intentionally or voluntarily.70 
(4') An acceptance of suffering. 
(5') An inflexibility about principles, in which principles remain fixed however the 
circumstances may change.  
(6') A recognition of parental authority, and parental duty to teach a moral code to children. 
Anscombe argues for each of (1’)-(6’) elsewhere.71 
 Among the letters of protest and outrage, is one by Nowell-Smith which identifies the 
task that needs undertaking if an ethical code based on (1’)-(6’) is to be possible; he intends this 
as a rebuke, but Anscombe instead sees it as an invitation:  
The general burden of her criticism of the morality of the country at large is that people 
tend to judge all acts by their consequences rather than by their “nature and quality” and 
she implies that Oxford philosophers share this attitude … Miss Anscombe seems to be 
(though I can scarcely believe that she is) ignorant of the difficulties involved in drawing 
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a distinction between an act and its consequences. For example, was Mr. Truman’s “act” 
the signing of an order, the killing of a number of Japanese, or the saving of a number of 
Japanese and other lives? If it was the first only, Miss Anscombe has, on her own 
principles, as little right to condemn it as Mr. Truman’s supporters have to defend it, 
since both judgments turn on its consequences. But if the killing is to be included in the 
nature and quality of Mr. Truman’s act, why not the saving of lives?72 
Nowell-Smith’s point is worth pause. Anscombe’s claim is that when Truman gave the order for 
the bombs to be dropped, what he did was commit mass murder, and that as such it was an act 
the nature and quality of which render it prohibited. But Nowell-Smith proposes that Anscombe 
faces a dilemma. If the “nature and quality of an act” is determined by what is done in the 
moment, then Truman’s act is morally neutral (all he did was put “his signature is at the foot of 
the order”); if it is determined by its foreseen consequences, Anscombe should include as part of 
the “nature and quality of the act” the lives that Truman predicted his act would save (by its 
preventing an “Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other”). In which case, what right has she 
to condemn Truman for murder rather than to praise him for life-saving?  
 In her letter of response, Anscombe simply acknowledges “the colossal difficulty of 
making out the character of an act” given that an act may be described in virtue of its foreseen 
consequences.73 She goes on: 
The suggestion that one cannot treat “Do not murder” as an intelligible commandment 
in a broadcast without a preliminary exposé of the philosophical problems of defining an 
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action seems to me in a high degree comic. I lecture on such problems in Oxford, in the 
philosophy of psychology.74 
During Hilary term (January-March) 1957—the term in which she gave her radio talk, and wrote 
that letter—Anscombe was delivering the series of lectures that became the Intention.  
3. The intended consequences of Intention 
Intention is an answer to the question “how do we tell the character of an act?” This is not a 
metaphysical question, but a conceptual one. What distinction are we making when we evoke 
these intuitively clear contrasts: “That was an expression of intention, not a prediction”; “that 
was involuntary not intentional”; “that was the cause, not the reason”? The central case 
Anscombe uses to illuminate this question is one of war and murder: 
A man is pumping water into the cistern which supplies the drinking water of a house. 
Someone has found a way of systematically contaminating the source with a deadly 
cumulative poison whose effects are unnoticeable until they can be cured. The house is 
regularly inhabited by a small group of party chiefs, with their immediate families, who 
are in control of a great state; they are engaged in exterminating the Jews and perhaps 
plan a world war.—The man who contaminated the source calculated that all if these 
people are destroyed some good men will get into power who will govern well …; and he 
has revealed the calculation, together with the fact about the poison, to the man who is 
pumping. The death of the inhabitants of the house will, of course, have all sorts of other 
effects […] 
 This man’s arm is going up and down, up and down. […] Now we may ask: What 
is this man doing? What is the description of his action?75 
Here is not the place to repeat Anscombe’s detailed answer, and there is certainly no space to 
work through the implications of this shift in our thinking about Intention’s task. However, a very 
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quick sketch of Anscombe’s answer to the question she poses in §38, will be enough to cast 
doubt on the idea that her book contains the three theses about action, three theses which need 
technical and argumentative scaffolding.  
Anscombe begins by pointing out that “of course, any description of what is going on, 
with him as the subject, which is in fact true” is a description of what he is doing.76 When we say 
what a man is “doing” in this wide sense, we are indifferent to the distinctions that are 
Anscombe’s topic. This list will include descriptions which he intends (“operating the pump”), 
knows (“clicking out a rhythm”), and does not know (“generating certain substances in some nerve 
fibres”); and descriptions in terms of consequences which are intended (“poisoning the 
inhabitants”), foreseen (“earning some money”), and unforeseen (“causing NN to come into some 
money through a legacy”).  She then notes that her “enquiries into the question “Why?” enables 
us to narrow down our considerations of descriptions of what he is doing to a range covering all 
and only his intentional actions”.77 This range is delimited by the application of the question 
“Why?”, the criteria for which are summarised in §16.78 Any description that falls within that 
range will give the “character of [his] act”. Next, Anscombe sets out how the descriptions within 
this range can be arranged into chains of descriptions, and it is this ordering principle that 
introduces the possibility of asking how many things that this man is doing, in that he is moving 
his arm up and down.79  
In this context, Anscombe’s focus on intentional action—on “what a man actually 
does”—is explained by the fact that it is there that the criteria for the application of the question 
“Why?”, and the formal order that the question reveals, are most easily brought into view. The 
priority is a matter of method and not metaphysics. The statement that a man knows what he is 
doing without observation is not an epistemological thesis. Rather, it is criterion for the 
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application of the question “Why?” The difficult work—work that will take us beyond 
conceptual analysis and into the human sciences—will of course be to describe the underlying 
capacity, or capacities, which enable us to give some descriptions which are true of use ‘straight 
off”.80  Finally, the “identity thesis”, so called, is no part of Anscombe’s view. That thesis has 
ontological commitments, it asserts an identity relation between entities: if a person Fs by Ging, 
then her act of Fing=her act of Ging. Anscombe’s, on the other hand, describes an “order that is 
there whenever actions are done with intentions”, an order which shows why a single action may 
be described in many ways.81  
 
The context I have described allows us to reconstruct the intended consequences of Intention—
consequences which have not come to pass. Had those first reviewers made the connection 
between Anscombe’s “righteous fury” and her philosophy of action, things might have turned 
out very differently.82  
 The most significant omission from the legacy of Intention is an attempt to undertake, 
using the account of action provided in Intention, the ethical task that Anscombe describes in 
“Modern Moral Philosophy”. That paper was published in January 1958, just a few months after 
Intention. In it Anscombe famously defends three theses, the first of which is that “moral 
philosophy … should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of 
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psychology”.83 What is needed, Anscombe says, before ethics can begin, is “an account at least of 
what a human action is at all, and how its description as ‘doing such-and-such’ is affected by its 
motive and by the intention or intentions in it; and for this an account of such concepts is 
needed”.84 Intention provides that piece of “conceptual analysis”. Anscombe’s intention in doing 
that work was to provide ethics with a starting point from which it could give an explanation of 
“how an unjust man is a bad man, or an unjust action a bad one”, not a starting point from 
which philosophers of mind and action could fill out technical details in a metaphysics of 
action.85 
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